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The revolution ofrational expectations has affected economists in an awkward way.
On the one hand, thebasic ideabehindthis theoryis usually"accepted", simplybecause
the concept of rational expectations is one (important) extension of equilibrium
economics everybody has learned. On the other hand, however, the implications and
policy conclusions are so strong - though not totally new - that most economists are
offended because they got used to a different kind ofmacroeconomics. And - after all -
is reality not totally different?
This bookgives anexcellent impression ofjustthese mixed feelings aboutthe impact
of the revolution. While reading it, one gets almost convinced in the beginning that the
REH is a long needed change in thinking about, for example, business cycles, whereas
later on one gets doubts, especially at the end when most of the empirical work ofthe
new classicals is questioned by more recent and - supposedly - stronger or more
sophisticated tests. In this sense, it is an honest book, because it leaves the questions
openwhenthey are. And intheheated debate between schools, thisbookis refreshingly
free of ideology and dogmatism.
The book explains in a very systematic manner the main contents and implications
of the REH. The logic of rational expectations is that an equilibrium model just cannot
do withoutthis hypothesis. Every othertheoryaboutexpectations is, ofcourse, possible,
and nobody can prove who is right and who is wrong. But the way expectations are
handled is a very critical matter for anyone who tries to model an economy. However
abstract this model may be, at a certain point the economist has to decide whether he
allows for ex-ante systematic errors or not. What REH implies is well demonstrated in
the "flexible price macroeconomic model" (Ch. 3): Only random shocks can cause
deviations of output from the natural level, and the size of the effect is negatively
correlated with the variance of aggregate demand (Lucas effect).
Much of the debate on REH deals with plausibility issues, but some things only
materialize when put down on paper. The econometric issues (Ch. 6) ofthe observation-
al equivalence and the Lucas critique are known to everyone doing econometric work.
However, some continue using the "old method" to give quantitative advice to
economic policy. This neglect must imply the opinion that, for example, parameters do
not change so quickly "in reality", thatthe mistakes one can make are onlyvery small.
Thatthis is notso hasbeen demonstrated ona theoreticalbasis andis also the subject of
many empirical tests.
The book covers the main empirical contributions which were usually published at
the same time the theory was done (Ch. 7). Both theory and empirical work together
had a strong impact on economic thinking, and in the late 1970s many economists
feIt inclined to follow the revolution. The "failure of Keynesianism" became obvious
when expansionary measures of monetary and fiscal policy led to a new round of
inflation without substantial progress for unemployment. This was Lucas' "clear-cutRezensionen - Book Reviews 179
experiment" of macroeconomics. Vp to this part of the book, the reader also gets the
idea that the REH could claim victory.
This claim would indeed have been premature, as we are told in the following
chapters. It is a bit surprising that most ofthe REH pioneers have somewhat resigned,
thinking maybe the revolution was done and the new theory sufficiently established so
that every criticism would do no more than a little scratch. Barro, Lucas and Lucas/
Sargent have published their own and others' collected work and since then have not
been so actively in the front ofthe debate as in the preceding decade. Thus there was no
strong response to the critics who seemed to gain ground on a technical level in the
sense that they questioned the validity or robustness of the pioneer empirical work by
formulating better models and by estimating with more sophisticated methods.
Though many of the points are weIl taken, the authors are a little too cautious and
mild with the critics (Chs. 8 -10).The critique thatthere may be measurement errors in
Lucas' 1973 calculations may be right, but it does not really hit the mark. Who would
argue today that the Phillips curves in Argentina, Brazil and similar countries are not
steeperthanthose in economies with low inflation? Weren'tthe Phillips curves in many
Western industrial countries steeper in the 1970s than in the 1960s? Isn't this what the
"Lucas trade off' wanted to explain?
Some of the tests quoted in eh. 9 do not confirm the hypothesis of efficiency in
financial markets. This, however, should not lead to the conclusion that expectations
are not rational. If someone finds some kind of systematic error in the forecasts for
exchange rates, would he seriously claim that anyone can make safe gains in this
market? Rational expectations mean that at each point of time "fair bets" are taking
place: Nobody knows ex ante if he is right or wrong. After the fact, one may find some
correlation of errors, but that does not mean that ex ante there were unexploited profit
opportunities. If there were, those economists should speculate and become rich
instead of wasting time writing articles.
One approach that stresses this important distinction of ex-ante and ex-post errors
has been formulated by Brunner, Cukierman, Meltzer (a contribution which, unfortu-
nately, is not mentioned in the book). Here, business cycles are due to the inability of
agents to distinguish between permanent and transitory changes of, for example,
monetary policy. At each point of time, they make the best possible forecast using all
relevant information (=rational expectations), and markets are always allowed to clear.
The persistence of deviations from the natural rate are created by errors which are
systematic in an ex-post sense. The authors are also unduly defensive when it comes to
current policy issues, especially the V.S. experience and the Thatcher policy. In spite of
common myths in the media (and also among economists), it is hard to see that the
policies of Reagan and Thatcher during the last years have much to do with the
recommendations of the new classical theory. It is more than a misunderstanding that
we have had a monetarist experiment or a clear-cut change of the policy regime in
either country: Monetary policy has been highly unstable and rarely hit the targets, and
fiscal policy - though in part doing more for the long-run targets than before through,
for example, tax cuts - has not followed the recommendations of steadiness and
predictability. And besides, the new classicals never said the natural rate was constant.
There are many factors on the "supply side" of the economy which lead us to believe
that the natural rate of unemployment has increased during the last years. It is far too
easy - and from all we know probably wrong - to say that the increase of unemploy-
ment was due to excessively tight monetary and fiscal policy. The authors faH to stress180 Literatur - Literature
that the Thatcher policy is not a test of the recommendations of the new classical
theory.
The conclusions ofthe book are therefore a little disappointing. Whatwas itall for?
"it (= REH) has not established itself as an empirically sound hypothesis" (p. 198). -
Which of the presently held hypotheses on business cycles is "empirically sound" or at
least significantly superiorto REH? Have the Keynesian models been unduly criticized;
should theynowbe considered "established" again? Can REH models notexplain some
features of business cycles better than, for example, "older" monetarist theories? In
some way, proponents of REH would not feel too sorry about not having superior
empirical evidence on their side, because they are also very cautious about what
econometrics can show. The main thrust of the revolution was rather that we should
have a better understanding ofbusiness cycles and other phenomena. The contribution
was mainly to stress thatwe should tryto understand reality as the result ofbehavior on
the side of agents. What is reality? Nobody knows. If we knew we would not need the
theory. The only facts we have are time series, which are mirrors of reality. The REH
message is that nobody should believe to have superior knowledge. Time series are an
outcome of behavior, and no model builder should assurne to have more knowledge
aboutbehavior than the agents "who do the behaving". This he would have to assurne if
he favored active stabilization policies. Therefore one should always be careful in saying
that reality is different than the theory suggests and we need more "realistic" assump-
tions. For example, the inertia ofprices andwages is nota fact in this sense, and even if
it was it can be explained in several ways - also by equilibrium theory. Thus "more
realism" cannot be an argument in favor of the sticky-price-model of Fischer-Phelps-
Taylor (Ch. 4). Taking this assumption of inertia for granted, stabilization policy is
possible. However, onemustalso drop the postulate ofoptimizingbehavior, which most
new classicals would refuse to do. Which model is more realistic cannot be judged a
priori. Apart from this, would it really be desirable to make policy recommendations
and decisions on the basis of some obserVable or predictable error on the part of
agents? Should policy want to fool the people?
All in all, the book is worth reading and is surely an excellent introduction into the
subject, in spite ofthe sometimesweak defense ofREH. Possibly also because it leaves it
very much to the reader to judge on the validity of criticisms, it has its value in the fact
that it is free ofmany ideological phrases and quarreis we read so much in otherbooks.
It is designed to inform students - and one should add: any economist who wants to
learn about an important new way of thinking - about what has happened in an
important area of economics during the last 15 years. It is more valuable than many of
the existing textbooks of macroeconomics where a chapter is added later on to make it
up to date. The bookis also less formal than e.g. Begg's on this subject; therefore it is, I
suppose, more attractive to many economists.
Joachim Scheide
Brems, Hans, Pioneering Economic Theory, 1630- 1980. A Mathematical
Restatement. Baltim0re, London 1986. The Johns Hopkins University Press. XV,
411 S.
'Hans Brems Bat eine Art dogmengeschichtliches Werk produziert, das gleicherma-
ßen interessant, anregend und ,anfechtbar ist. Brems geht von der sicherlich weithin